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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Around the globe, the latest fashion in corporate governance circles is “Say on Pay,” a 
shareholder vote -- sometimes precatory, other times mandatory – on CEO remuneration. 
Country after country has adopted Say on Pay in response to shareholder disgust over the size of 
CEO pay packets.  Beginning with the U.K., and later followed by the Netherlands, Australia, 
Sweden, Norway, Belgium, France, Switzerland, and the U.S., there has been a widespread 
acceptance of the shareholder vote on executive pay around the world.  In this article, we ask the 
question: Should New Zealand follow the crowd and adopt Say on Pay, or should it continue 
down its own path, leaving directors with near total control over executive remuneration levels? 
 
Academics are divided over the desirability of Say on Pay -- those that believe in strong 
managerial power are firmly against it, while shareholder activists come out heavily in its favor.  
The main theoretical arguments revolve around whether: it will tip the balance of power against 
managers; shareholders are competent to evaluate executive remuneration; third party voting 
advisors will gain too much power if it is enacted; there will be any reduction in the size, and rate 
of growth, of CEO pay packets; and it will strengthen the relationship between pay and 
performance.   
 
The experience in the U.K. and the U.S. to date sheds some light on the validity of these 
arguments. On average, shareholders have voted strongly in favor of executive pay practices at 
most companies.  Say on Pay seems to have had little impact on the size and growth of average 
CEO pay, but it does appear to have impacted pay practices at poorly performing companies that 
have unusually high pay.  There is a greater level of engagement between shareholders and 
managers on pay issues at many companies, and firms have become more responsive to negative 
shareholder Say on Pay votes.  Third party voting advisors, such as Institutional Shareholder 
Services, have become important corporate governance players, whose recommendations have a 
significant impact on shareholder voting outcomes. 
 
In light of these academic arguments, and practical experience in the U.K. and U.S., we 
believe that New Zealand should carefully consider whether to adopt Say on Pay.  We do not 
view the evidence as compelling the conclusion that Say on Pay is essential, but we can 
understand why some shareholders might want to see it implemented.  However, the existing 
evidence shows that it is unlikely to have a big effect on current pay practices at most companies 




This article proceeds as follows. In Section I, we lay out the legal and corporate governance 
framework for setting executive remuneration in New Zealand. We move on in section II to 
consider the academic arguments for and against the adoption of Say on Pay.  In Section III, we 
summarize the U.K. and American experience with Say on Pay.  Finally, in section IV, we 
summarize the lessons from the earlier sections to consider whether New Zealand should adopt 
this regime, and if so, how it would do so.   
 
I. Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in New Zealand  
 
An essential first step to our analysis of Say on Pay is to lay a solid foundation for 
understanding the current system for determining executive remuneration in New Zealand. In 
this section, we begin by reviewing the legal rules that relate to determining managerial pay.  We 
then look at the basic components of executive remuneration today and the trends in overall 
levels and composition of managerial pay packets.  We finish this section by surveying investor 
and public reactions in New Zealand to executive remuneration trends. 
 
A. The Legal Rules on Director Compensation In New Zealand 
 
The legal underpinnings for executive remuneration in New Zealand have developed over 
time.  Under common law, a quantum meruit claim by a director to be paid remuneration was 
rejected in Wellington Audio Visual Ltd v Euro Boston Group Ltd (No 2).
1
 Heath J rejected the 
argument that a director could recover reasonable costs of services because directors are 
fiduciaries. “The risk of conflict, inherent in the benefit for directors who receive remuneration 
and (potential) detriment to the company that pays, has led to prescriptive rules being adopted to 
promote informed decision-making about whether (and to what extent) a director should be 
remunerated.”
2
 Since no automatic right to remuneration for agreeing to act as a director of a 
company exists at common law,
3
 and directors are not automatically employees of the company 
by virtue of having been appointed, executive directors must enter into a separate employment 
arrangement with the company.
4
 Executive directors are then entitled both to directors’ fees and 
to remuneration as employees.  
 
Both executive and non-executive directors must comply with the remuneration provision of 
the Companies Act 1993; s 161. Subject to any restriction in the constitution, the board has the 
authority to authorize payment of remuneration or other benefits to directors for services 
performed as a director or in any other capacity. This provision includes employment 
agreements.
5
 Payment made pursuant to employment agreements authorized under the provision 
                                                          
1
 Wellington Audio Visual Ltd v Euro Boston Group Ltd (No 2) 31/3/10, Heath J, HC Auckland CIV-2007-404-
1089. 
2
 Ibid, para 23. The Judge followed Guinness Plc v Saunders [1990] 2 AC 663, where the House of Lords said that 
there can be no contract to pay special remuneration for the services of a director unless that contract is entered into 
pursuant to the articles of association. The New Zealand equivalent is s 161 of the Companies Act 1993. 
3
 Guinness Plc v Saunders [1990] 2 AC 663 (HL). 
4
 McLenaghan v Kiwi Seed Co Ltd (1993) 4 NZELC 98,182. 
5
 Companies Act 1993, s 161(1) (a). 
3 
 
need not be authorized separately.
6
 Perhaps surprisingly, directors are permitted to vote in favor 
of proposals relating to their own remuneration.
7
 Section 161(1) is expressed to be subject to the 
constitution of the company so companies in their constitutions can impose additional 
requirements for remuneration, including requiring  that remuneration committees of 
independent directors be established or requiring that directors not vote on their own 
remuneration.  
 
The board must be satisfied the remuneration is fair to the company.
8
  The term ‘fair” is not 
defined in the legislation nor has there been much litigation on the meaning of the term in a 
remuneration context. In Managh v Jordan,
9
 the High Court considered whether payments made 
to the director of a car dealership in the period that he wound up the business were fair in terms 
of s 161(5). The payments had not been authorized in accordance with s 161. Miller J considered 
that the payments were fair; the director behaved as a receiver would have in winding up the 
business.
10
 In Bridgecorp Management Services Ltd (in rec) v Roest, one of the executive 
directors of Bridgecorp Management Services Ltd (in rec) was ordered to repay $313,906 of his 
$543,000 salary package.  The remuneration and bonus had not been properly approved by the 




Determination of fees of for non-executive directors has generally been regarded as a matter 
for the company with the courts being reluctant to interfere.
12
 However, under the Companies 
Act 1993, particulars of the payment must be entered in the interests register
13
 and directors 
voting in favor of the remuneration must state why they consider it is fair to the company.
14
 
Excessive remuneration may be evidence of oppression and thus provide for potential remedies 
for shareholders under s 174 of the Act. Excessive remuneration may also be evidence of an 




1. Special Rules for SMEs 
 
New Zealand has a high number of small and medium enterprises (SMEs); around 97 % 
of New Zealand’s companies are SMEs. An alternative remuneration procedure exists for small 
or closely held companies. Section 107(1)(f) provides that subject to satisfying the solvency test 
set out in s 108 of this Act, if all entitled persons have agreed or concur, remuneration may be 
                                                          
6
 Companies Act 1993, s 161(3). 
7
 Company, Corporate & Securities Law, NZ Company Law and Practice Commentary, DIRECTORS’ 
RELATIONS WITH COMPANY AND THIRD PARTIES [¶10-645] Remuneration. 
8
 Companies Act 1993, s 161(1). 
9
 Managh v Jordan [2010] NZCCLR 4. 
10
 Ibid, para 41. 
11
 Bridgecorp Management Services Ltd (in rec) v Roest HC Auckland CIV-2008-404-003013, 14 September 2009. 
12
 Re Halt Garage (1964) Ltd [1982] 3 All ER 1016. 
13
 Companies Act 1993, s 161(2). 
14
 Companies Act 1993, s 161(4). 
15
 Re Day-Nite Carriers Ltd (in liq) [1975] 1 NZLR 172. 
4 
 
authorized otherwise than in accordance with s 161(1). Entitled persons are shareholders and 
persons upon whom the constitution confers any of the rights and powers of a shareholder.
16
 
Section 107(4) provides that even if all entitled persons agree: “no agreement or concurrence of 
the entitled persons is valid or enforceable unless the agreement or concurrence is in writing.” In 
National Trade Manuals Ltd (in liq) v Watson,
17
the court considered that the effect of a failure to 
comply with this provision invalidated the payment.
18
 If there is no proper explanation for the 
drawings or a valid resolution classifying the drawings in some other way, such as distributions 




New Zealand has a relatively small proportion of companies with dispersed ownership. 
According to Berle, companies where ownership is so widely distributed that no one individual 
or group has a minority interest that is large enough to allow them to exert dominance over the 
company’s affairs should be classified as management control companies.
20
 A study of the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) top fifty companies in 2009 showed that only 24 % had 
management control.
21
 Most (38 %) had minority control. Say on Pay legislation would be likely 
to have the biggest impact on companies that are management controlled as it is in those 
companies that shareholders currently have the least power to affect compensation. 
 
 
2. Golden Handshakes 
 
“Golden handshake” payments are payments made to directors for loss of office. The 
payments are made either as damages for breach of a separate employment agreement or for loss 
of office as director. Whereas the distinction was important under the earlier Companies Act 
1955,
22
 the procedure for both types of payments to directors is the same under the Companies 
Act 1993. Under the provisions of the Companies Act 1993, which apply to all companies, 
entering into an agreement to pay an employee director compensation for loss of office is 
covered by the legislation.
23
 Therefore, when approving employment agreements with substantial 
golden handshake clauses inserted for executive directors, all directors would have to be satisfied 




                                                          
16
 Companies Act 1993, s 2(1). 
17
 National Trade Manuals Ltd (in liq) v Watson (2006) 9 NZCLC 264,163 (HC). 
18
 Ibid at  para 42 
19
 National Trade Manuals Ltd (in liq) v Watson (2006) 9 NZCLC 264,163; Re Samarang Developments Ltd (in liq); 
alt cit Walker v Campbell 30/9/04, John Hansen J, HC Christchurch CIV-2003-409-2094, para 55. 
20
 A  A Berle and G C Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Harcourt, Brace and World, 
Inc,1933) 
21
 C Giles and  S Watson, “Evidence of Ownership and Control in the Top NZX non-financial corporations” (2012) 
33 The Company Lawyer 115-128. 
22
 Rowe v Taupo Totara Timber Co Ltd [1976] 2 NZLR 506. 
23
 Companies Act 1993, subss 161(1) (b), 161(1) (e). 
24
 However, it is unlikely, because of s 161 and the directors’ statutory duty to exercise powers for a proper purpose, 
Companies Act 1993, s 133, that entering into such an agreement to repel potential takeovers would be valid.  
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3. Disclosure Requirements 
 
Compared with other jurisdictions, New Zealand has very minimal remuneration 
disclosure requirements for directors. Section 211(1) (f) merely requires the total of the 
remuneration and the value of other benefits received by each of the directors or former directors 
during the accounting period to be disclosed.
25
 But section 211(1) (g) imposes a disclosure 
requirement for the remuneration of employees. The company in its annual report must state the 
number of employees or former employees of the company, not being directors of the company, 
who, during the accounting period, received remuneration and any other benefits in their 
capacity as employees, the value of which was or exceeded $100,000 per annum. The report 




The requirement that executive compensation be disclosed has attracted criticism from 
the New Zealand Securities Commission, the New Zealand Employers Federation, the New 
Zealand Business Roundtable, the New Zealand Privacy Commissioner and high-profile 
commercial lawyers.
27
  In 1997 the Privacy Commissioner investigated whether the disclosure of 
executive compensation was an undue intrusion on the privacy of executives, concluding that it 
was. The Commissioner concluded that while “directors must be accountable to shareholders 
[…] employees are usually seen in a somewhat different light, owing their accountability to the 




While the provision has remained in place, its effectiveness has been questioned.
29
 In fact 
there is evidence that the introduction of disclosure requirements led to an increase in the level of 
remuneration of both CEOs and executives.
30
 In a 2002 study of 102 companies listed on the 
NZX examining executive compensation in the year after disclosure was introduced, there was 
no evidence found of a relationship between pay and performance. Instead, CEO pay seemed to 
                                                          
25
 Compare the requirements in Australia under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 298, where a directors’ report has 
to be prepared that contains details of board policy regarding remuneration and the relationship between pay and 
performance. See the discussion in A. Schoenemann, “Executive Remuneration in New Zealand and Australia: Do 
Current Laws, Regulations and Guidelines Ensure “Pay for Performance?” (2006) 37 VUWLR 31, at pp.63-64. 
26
 Companies Act 1993, s 211(1) (f). 
27
 A. Andjelkovic, G. Boyle, and W. McNoe, “Public disclosure of executive compensation: Do shareholders need 
to know?” (2002) 10 Pacific-Basin Finance Journal. 97, 101. See also  F Elayan, J Lau, and T Meyer, “ Executive 
Incentive Compensation Schemes and Their Impact on Corporate Performance: Evidence from New Zealand Since 
Legal Disclosure Requirements became Effective,” (2003) 21 Studies in Economics and Finance 54, (study of 73 
listed companies) and Gunasekaragea and Wilkinson, (2002) 10 International Journal of Business Studies 45,( 
studies which support these findings in the New Zealand context.) 
28
 Mandatory Disclosure Of Executive Remuneration Report By The Privacy Commissioner To The Minister Of 
Justice On The Mandatory Disclosure Of Executive Remuneration Under Section 211 Of The Companies Act 1993, 
24 November 1997. 
29
 G. Shirtcliffe, “Executive remuneration - does sunlight disinfect or fertilize?” New Zealand Herald, 2 September 
2011. (“some sort of “moral licensing” phenomenon can arise - the discloser unconsciously treating the disclosure as 
having partially discharged their obligations to the beneficiary, thereby making them less assiduous in protecting the 
beneficiary’s interests.”) 
30
 H. Roberts, “CEO Power, Executive Compensation and Firm Performance New Zealand 1997 – 2002” last 
updated 15 April 2005 and accessed from http://otago.ourarchive.ac.nz/handle/10523/1524. 
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depend on firm size. Interestingly though firms that voluntarily disclosed CEO compensation 




4. Listed Company Requirements 
 
Additional requirements exist for companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
(NZX). The aggregated component of directors’ remuneration (“ a monetary sum per annum 
payable to all Directors of the Issuer taken together”)
32
 payable to directors in that capacity (as 
opposed to their capacity as executive directors) must be approved by an ordinary resolution of 
shareholders. The resolution may allow for a part or the whole of the remuneration to be payable 
by means of equity securities (which is defined broadly to include share options and other forms 
of securities).
33
 The Rule does not apply to executive remuneration or payment to directors in 
their capacity as executives; it explicitly states that remuneration for work not in the capacity as 




The requirements in the Rules are elaborated on in the NZX Corporate Governance Best 
Practice Code (“the Code’). The Code is non-mandatory, being intended “to enhance investor 
confidence through corporate governance and accountability” and being “composed of flexible 
principles which recognise differences in corporate size and culture.” Companies are required to 





The Code states that companies, unless constrained by size, should establish 
remuneration committees and have a formal and transparent method to recommend director’s 
remuneration to shareholders. The annual report should identify the members of the 
remuneration committee. The Code also recommends that the remuneration committee produce a 
written charter that outlines its authority, duties, responsibilities and relationship with the board. 
The charter should also set out any requirements for the composition of the remuneration 
committee and gives, as an example, that there might be a requirement for a minimum number of 
independent directors- the Code does not however explicitly recommend that a remuneration 
committee be comprised, in whole or in part, of independent directors. No details about the 
composition of director’ remuneration are in the Code apart from a recommendation that any 
equity security plans should not vest for at least two years after the grant of plan entitlements to 
the director. 
 
5. Remuneration Committees 
 
                                                          
31
 A. Andjelkovic, G. Boyle, W. McNoe, “Public disclosure of executive compensation: Do shareholders need to 
know?” (2002) 10 Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 97. 
32
 NZX Limited, NZSX/NZDX Listing Rules (6 August 2010) r 3.5.1. 
33
 NZX Limited, NZSX/NZDX Listing Rules (6 August 2010) r 3.5.1, r 1.6.1. 
34
 NZX Limited, NZSX/NZDX Listing Rules (6 August 2010) r 3.5.1. 
35




A study that focused on the impact of the Code found that in 2010, 79.3 % of New 
Zealand boards had remuneration committees (compared with 33.3 % in 1995.)
36
 This is lower 
than comparable jurisdictions: (an Australian study found that in 2002, 88 % of Australian listed 
companies had remuneration committees and a US study found that in the US 99 % had a 
separate remuneration committee in 2003.) The percentage of independent directors on the New 
Zealand remuneration committees remained about the same. 
 
Unlike comparable jurisdictions, direct CEO involvement in remuneration determination 
as members of the remuneration committee is not unusual in New Zealand. A recent study 
revealed that 21 % of CEOs of surveyed companies were involved as members of the 




Interestingly, and contrary to the results that might be expected from a managerial power 
view of executive compensation, a recent study shows that annual pay increments for CEOs with 
this apparent advantage averaged four percentage points less than those awarded to other 
CEOs.
38
 The authors conclude that the “results suggest that highly visible arrangements which, 
on the surface, appear an open invitation for CEOs to behave opportunistically, may in fact 
induce them to exercise greater restraint.”  
 
6. Regulatory Agencies 
 
Prior to the global financial crisis, the New Zealand Securities Commission (NZSC) had 
oversight over the capital markets in New Zealand. It was viewed, depending on the perspective 
of the commentator, either as insufficiently proactive, or under resourced and lacking power. 
Following the crisis and the collapse in New Zealand of the finance company sector where non-
bank deposit takers were largely unregulated, a more powerful and better resourced body, the 
Financial Markets Authority (FMA), was created and the functions of the Securities Commission 
subsumed into the new body. One of the roles of the NZSC taken over by the FMA is an 
oversight over corporate governance (it oversees securities, financial reporting, and company law 
as they apply to financial services and securities markets.)
39
 So far, the FMA has adopted 
corporate governance guidelines from the Securities Commission that were written in 2004.  In 
its Corporate Governance Guidelines, the Financial Markets Authority requires that the 
remuneration of directors and executives should be transparent, fair, and reasonable, with 
executive (including executive director) remuneration being clearly differentiated from non-
executive director remuneration. Executive director remuneration packages should include an 
element that is dependent on entity and individual performance. 
  
                                                          
36
 G. Boyle and X. Jane, “New Zealand Corporate Boards in Transition: Composition, Activity and Incentives 
Between 1995 and 2010,” last updated on 30 April 2012 and last accessed from: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2079314 on 2 November 2012, 13. 
37
 Ibid at p 16. 
38
 G. Boyle and H. Roberts, “CEO Presence on the Compensation Committee: A Puzzle,” forthcoming (2012) 
Journal of Economics and Business last accessed from http://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/handle/10092/5370 on 30 October 
2012. 
39
 http://www.fma.govt.nz/about-us/ last accessed 25 October 2012. 
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As one of its last tasks before been disbanded, the New Zealand Securities Commission 
reviewed corporate governance disclosure by selected issuers against the guidelines.
40
 It found 
that generally issuers provided clear and comprehensive information on directors’ and 
executives’ remuneration, including use of remuneration policies and committees. The NZSC 
commented that the level of remuneration disclosure has improved significantly since its last 
review in 2005 with the NZSC recognising that improvements in disclosures may be a result of 
the increased scrutiny and sensitivity of directors’ and executives’ remuneration. Roughly 65 % 
of all issuers disclosed relevant details relating to their remuneration policy for directors and 
executives compared with 40 % in 2005; with 34 % of publicly owned entities publishing that 
document in full (compared with 25 % in 2005); and 64 % of publicly owned entities disclosed 




The NZSC emphasized the importance of the relationship between remuneration and risk 
being seen in corporate governance policies, practices and disclosures. In its view, and citing the 
UK corporate governance code,
42
 remuneration incentives should align with financial and non-
financial performance measures relating to the issuer’s objectives, and be compatible with risk 




In a working paper using semi-structured interviews and examining New Zealand’s 
discourse on executive remuneration, and how it influences remuneration committees’ decision 
making, Neil Crombie found that, while non-executive directors use many rationales to justify or 
legitimise their decisions, it was the market rationale that dominated the discourse on executive 




B. Pay Trends for CEOs in New Zealand 
 
The mix of executive remuneration in New Zealand is broadly consistent with comparable 
jurisdictions. Remuneration consultants take account of overseas trends in executive 
compensation. In line with other jurisdictions, this has led to an increase in the levels of 
remuneration over the past twenty years although the size of the economy, the size of listed 
companies and  the generally sluggish share market has meant both the rate and amount of 
increase has not been as great as in comparable jurisdictions. 
 
                                                          
40
 New Zealand Securities Commission, Review of Corporate Governance Disclosure by Selected Issuers, July 2010 
at http://www.fma.govt.nz/media/178304/cgrp-report.pdf last accessed 25 October 2012. 
41
 Ibid at p 14. 
42
 Financial Reporting Council Limited, 2010, June. The UK Corporate Governance Code. Available 
URL: http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/ukcgcode.cfm.  In New Zealand, Securities Commission, Review of 
Corporate Governance Disclosure by Selected Issuers, July 2010 at http://www.fma.govt.nz/media/178304/cgrp-
report.pdf accessed 25 October 2012, at p15.  
43
 New Zealand Securities Commission, Review of Corporate Governance Disclosure by Selected Issuers, July 2010 
at http://www.fma.govt.nz/media/178304/cgrp-report.pdf  last accessed 25 October 2012, at p15. 
44
 N.Crombie, “New Zealand’s Discourse on Executive Remuneration” last accessed from 
http://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/handle/10092/4986 on 1 November 2012. 
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Performance pay is prevalent although this was not the case as late as 2005 where only 75 % 
of CEOs of listed companies were identified as having a performance-related component in their 
remuneration.
45
 In 2000 no companies were identified as offering long term incentive (LTI) 
schemes to their executives
46
 and in 2005 only twelve percent of listed company executives were 




Perhaps the best recent source of information about executive, executive director and director 
remuneration trends is the annual PwC Executive Reward Report, which has been produced 
since 2010.
48
 The 2012 report includes data from 131 companies, more than 1,000 positions and 
covers CEO positions and executive roles that report directly to the CEO as well as executive 
roles that are not CEO direct reports. The participating companies are mainly private sector 
businesses, but include some state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Two thirds of participating 
companies have revenue of more than $100 million. The report data includes fixed pay, short 
term incentives (actual, target and deferred) and annualised long term incentive grant values. 
During the period (year ending 31 March 2012) fixed annual remuneration (FAR) increased by 
3.7 % with CEO FAR increasing by 5.8 %. About 15 % of executives received no increase. 
There was an increase in short term incentive (STI) payouts in the period (from 64 % in 2011 to 
77 % in 2012) with STI schemes less prevalent in SMEs. In 2011 one- third of those incumbent 
in positions received total remuneration that was equal to or less than their 2010 packages. In the 
2012 survey only seven percent of incumbents were paid the same or less. Overall, 
approximately 80 % of packages were fixed pay, 15 % were STI payouts, four percent were long 
term incentive (LTI) grants and one percent were deferred STIs and Kiwisaver. These figures 
were almost exactly the same as the 2011 figures. 
 
The report identified two clear trends in LTIs. First, most LTI plans designed in New 
Zealand include performance measures. Secondly, nil price schemes, where executives may 
receive an equity interest at no cost to themselves, remain prevalent.
49
  In 2012 the number of 
organization offering LTIs dropped from 45 % in 2011 to 37 % in 2012 but a number of 




In terms of the relationship with the average wage, the New Zealand experience has 
mirrored overseas trends.  In the Higbee Schäffler 2008 Corporate Services & Executive 
Management Survey, the median fixed remuneration for top tier CEOs was $690,000, with an 
                                                          
45
 Sheffield CEO Survey 2005 (Sheffield, Auckland, 2005) cited in A. Schoenemann, “ Executive Remuneration in 
New Zealand and Australia: Do Current Laws, Regulations and Guidelines Ensure “Pay for Performance?” (2006) 
37 VUWLR 31, at p 42. 
46
 J. Healy, Corporate Governance and Wealth Creation in New Zealand (Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, 2003) 
174. 
47
 Sheffield CEO Survey 2005 (Sheffield, Auckland, 2005) cited in A. Schoenemann, “Executive Remuneration in 
New Zealand and Australia: Do Current Laws, Regulations and Guidelines Ensure “Pay for Performance”?” (2006) 
37 VUWLR 31, 44. 
48
 PWC, 2012 Executive Reward Report Summary of Findings, October 2012. 
49
 Examples of these schemes are performance share rights, share loan and bonus schemes. 
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additional $250,000 in STIs. At that time the average wage was just over $49,000, meaning 
group CEOs in New Zealand earned 14 times in fixed pay what the average employee earned. 
This contrasts with 1998, when the average wage was just on $33,300 and the median pay for a 
CEO was between 6.5 and 11 times that (about $215,000 and $356,000 for medium and large 




In terms of quantum, the New Zealand Institute of Directors 2012 survey, which covers 
1,610 directorships and 994 organizations throughout New Zealand, found that median fee for a 
non-executive director increased by 2.9% to $36,000, while the median fee for a non-executive 
chairman increased by 15.3% to $48,834 over the previous year.
51
 New Zealand directors are 
paid about a third less than their Australian counterparts, after adjustments for size and risk.
52
 
Senior executive pay rose 84% in the decade to 2011, to a median of $670,000 in private-sector 
organizations with a turnover of around $350 million a year and with over 1000 employees. 
Total remuneration rose 60% to about $500,000 in private companies with a turnover of around 
$100 million.
53
 The lower quantum of remuneration in New Zealand than in comparable 




A recent study of New Zealand boards in the period between 1995 and 2010, which focused 
on the impact of the introduction of the NZX corporate governance best practice code, revealed 
that fees paid to board chairs and directors increased by more than 60 % in real terms during the 
period (where the all-sector Labor cost index increase over the same period was 1.5 %.) 
Interestingly (and surprisingly given the NZX Best Practice Code recommendation) ownership 







C. Public and Investor Reaction to Executive Remuneration Trends 
                                                          
50
 Strategic Pay, What Price a Good CEO accessed from 
http://www.strategicpay.co.nz/Portals/0/Documents/What%20Price%20a%20Good%20CEO%200508.pdf (last 
accessed 16 April 2013. 
51
 ‘Is three per cent the new black’  Scoop News.htm accessed 30 October 2012 
52
Attracting top directors tough on present pay, March 18 2012,  Unlimited Magazine New Zealand.mht 
53
 Statistics from Strategic Pay in R. Laugeson, “The Overpaid Executive,” New Zealand Listener, February 18, 
2012. The article suggests that keeping tabs on pay levels may be more an art than a science. Another consultancy, 
Moyle Remuneration, has drawn dramatically different conclusions. Its figures suggest pay for chief executives have 
been rising more slowly than for the average worker. According to its records, for organizations with a turnover of 
$100-200 million, median CEO remuneration was up only 40% in the decade to 2010, to $385,000. For 
organizations with a turnover of $200-500 million, remuneration was up 23% to $450,000, and for those with 
turnover above $500 million, it was up only 12% to $675,000 over the decade.” 
54
 G. Boyle and X. Jane, “New Zealand Corporate Boards in Transition: Composition, Activity and Incentives 
Between 1995 and 2010” last updated on 30 April 2012 and last accessed from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2079314 on 2 November 2012, 1311.  
55
 G. Boyle and X. Jane, “New Zealand Corporate Boards in Transition: Composition, Activity and Incentives 
Between 1995 and 2010” last updated on 30 April 2012 and last accessed from 




In common with other jurisdictions, the escalation of executive remuneration in New Zealand 
has attracted its share of trenchant criticism. A recent article suggests that the “rising tide of 
corporate pay has helped float executive boats elsewhere in the economy” highlighting the recent 
march by 4000 people protesting a $68,000 pay rise awarded to the Christchurch city council 
chief executive while Christchurch is going through the earthquake recovery process.
56
 The 
article suggests that increases have “sprung out of a culture that has elevated leadership as being 
the critical ingredient in the success or failure of an enterprise” and argues that “many ordinary 
workers find it difficult to comprehend how that worth is actually calculated, and have a 
sneaking suspicion that the link between effort and reward has become, at best, tenuous. “
57
 A 
retired remuneration consultant spoke out in the press recently about the practice of using market 
data to justify pay packets and drive up executive compensation saying that there was an “overt 
movement” by many employers to pay salaries “at or above median.”
58
 These observations are 
supported by the experience in other jurisdictions where greater levels of disclosure have led to 




Other commentators have focused on the lack of connection between executive pay levels 
and corporate performance.  One such comment stated: 
 
“A second theme mentioned was the irresponsibly high level of directors’ remuneration in 
the larger companies in recent years, which often seems to go up in leaps out of all 
proportion to any increase in living costs and to do so however badly the corporation has 
been performing. I fear that there may be limits here to what can be accomplished by 
tinkering with the rules of law: perhaps if the captains of industry and commerce in question 





If accepted, this line of thought argues in favor of adopting Say on Pay, or even more 
stringent measures, to improve the connection between pay and performance. 
 
Much of the media coverage is tempered with an acceptance that if New Zealand firms are to 
attract high performing executives, high and escalating remuneration is an inevitable cost.
61
 
                                                          
56
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57
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Remuneration of CEOs of Banks has attracted opprobrium largely because the Banks being 
Australian owned and highly profitable are perceived to be taking money out of Kiwi pockets. 
The most outrage is reserved for high compensation and particular severance payments for CEOs 
in companies that are perceived to have under-performed.
62
 Like other jurisdictions, it is often 





Some, such as the chairwoman of Auckland International Airport and Mighty River Power 
Joan Withers, advocate more transparency in how boards report on remuneration: “We need a 
comprehensive piece of work to look at remuneration, at transparency, and how it should be 
reported and what’s best practice” arguing that if boards show clearly how pay is linked to 
performance, this will lead to more support for the packages.   Auckland International Airport, 
for example, discloses how its chief executive’s total remuneration is broken down into base pay 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
international salaries when assessing the remuneration of their senior executives.  So US senior executive pay levels 
quickly set a precedent for the rest of the world because consultants take these into account when advising non-US 
boards. This process ratchets-up salaries in other countries, with Australia being a good example of this. As a result, 
income inequality across the Tasman, as defined by the OECD, has escalated dramatically over the past 30 years. 
Australian directors argue that they have to pay international salaries to keep their top executives and this means 
they follow US trends. In addition, the share registries of nearly all the major Australian companies are dominated 
by institutions, rather than individuals. Many of these institutions are not long-term owners, as demonstrated by their 
aggressive selling of shares in Billabong, Kathmandu, and other companies when these ASX-listed entities 
announced recent profit downgrades. New Zealand follows Australia and the remunerations of our senior executives 
are rapidly ascending as a result.” 
62
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executives received pay rises last year - with a median increase of 5 per cent - despite the worldwide recession and 
many workers enduring salary freezes. Shareholders Association chairman Bruce Sheppard said he was also 
surprised. "I have no problem with CEO pay going up if they deliver on the performance criteria the board set for 
them, but I can't see too much rationale to increase base pay," he said.”), B Gaynor , “Tread carefully with director 
fee increases” 22 October, 2011, (“Protest and poor performance will make pay a major issue. Director fee increases 
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remuneration for non-executive company directors.”), B Gould, “Time to break unfair bonus culture” The New 
Zealand Herald, 3 September 2009, (“Eyebrows and ire were both raised by recent reports of big bonuses - 
contributing to even bigger remuneration packages - paid out to the executives of some of our leading companies. 
Even when those companies had seen profit margins fall substantially.”) 
63
 “CEO pay packets 9.9pc fatter, “Dominion Post, 20 August 2012 (“The average base salary for chief executives 
rose $28,311 or 9.9 per cent last year to $315,000 according to the latest Strategic Pay survey of 3674 Kiwi 
executives. Somebody working full time on the minimum wage of $12.57 an hour would earn $26,145 a year.”), 
“Because they're worth it?” Unlimited magazine, 23 August 2011 (“The pay divide between NZ CEOs and 
employees is not excessive compared to overseas counterparts, but if the gap widens it may start to matter.”), G. 
Shirtcliff, “Executive pay may be caught in an upward spiral,” The New Zealand Herald, 2 September 2011 (“The 
boss has always earned a multiple of what the average worker earns. But over the past 15 years, that multiple has 
increased. A recent survey estimates that NZX-listed companies now pay their CEOs an average 18 times what they 





 The New Zealand Shareholders’ Association is less sanguine; arguing the 




In other jurisdictions, proxy advisory firms such as ISS assist institutional shareholders in 
informing themselves about executive pay. Often they will interact with boards about identified 
issues in relation to executive pay. At present, there are no third party voting advisory services 
based in New Zealand.  This means that institutional investors in New Zealand must rely on their 
own research or a sharebroker or other analysts to inform themselves about executive pay. This 
is likely to pose a barrier to strong collective voting behavior by these investors and impede the 
effectiveness of Say on Pay. 
The Government shows no signs of moving towards taking steps that might curb executive 
remuneration. The Finance Minister Bill English recently said, “We don’t believe there’s a 
significant problem and I think companies will be picking up the shift in public views about what 
people get paid right at the top end.”
66
 Given this position, the prospects for significant change to 
the legal and corporate governance rules for executive remuneration in New Zealand seem bleak 
at the moment.  However, if there were forceful arguments that Say on Pay would result in 
beneficial changes for shareholders in New Zealand corporations, perhaps the government would 
shift its view.  
In the next section, to help sort out the pros and cons of Say on Pay, we recap the academic 
debate that has been ongoing in other countries over the value of that innovation.   
 




Prior to its enactment in the U.K. and elsewhere, there was an active academic debate about 
whether a required shareholder vote on executive pay was a good idea and whether it would be 
effective.  The debate regarding the effects of Say on Pay revealed a variety of questions and 
proposed answers, largely stemming from: 1) different attitudes about whether and how 
executive pay was a problem; 2) the advocates’ varying philosophies toward the role of 
shareholder voting; and 3) differences over the conclusions to draw from the existing evidence 
on Say on Pay.
68
   
 
Academics accept that an advisory shareholder vote on corporate pay policies would alter 
the shareholder role in corporate governance.
69
   Whether that was viewed as a good thing, or a 
bad one, varied along ideological lines. Academics opposing shareholder activism concluded that 
                                                          
64
 Ibid; G. Vaughan, “ANZ, BNZ and Westpac CEOs paid a combined NZ$12 million; Finsec floats idea of 




 R. Laugeson, The Overpaid Executive,” New Zealand Listener, February 18, 2012. 
67
 The next two sections draw heavily on prior work of one of the authors.  See Randall S. Thomas, Alan R. Palmiter 
and James F. Cotter, “Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will It Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate 
Governance?”(2012) 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1213. 
68
 Ibid at  1226. 
69
 Thomas et al., supra at note 67 , 1228. 
14 
 
Say on Pay would undermine the efficiency of a "board centrism."
70
 On the other hand, 




1. Will Say on Pay shift the balance of power in the corporation?  
 
Advocates believe Say on Pay will result in greater efficiency and social responsiveness 
as the mechanism provides more transparency and accountability. Say on Pay, in their eyes, 
would help boards negotiate CEO pay packages more effectively on behalf of shareholders.
72
 
The skeptics, on the other hand, claimed that a shareholder vote on executive pay would disturb 
the balance of authority between the board of directors and the company’s shareholders.
73
 One 
critic argued that Say on Pay would undermine the efficiency of the "board centric" corporation, 
the "command" mode of organization chosen by US public corporations.
74
  One response to this 
claim was that a mandatory Say on Pay vote would not change the existing allocation of 
shareholder and board power.
75
 Shareholders already have the ability to express their concerns 
about executive pay by speaking directly with management, the casting a vote against or 
withholding of a vote for directors sitting on compensation committees with undesirable pay 
policies, and shareholder proposals seeking voluntary company adoption of Say on Pay.
76
  One 
rejoinder was that because it was already possible to have such a vote without it being 
mandatory, that a required vote would create few benefits but was certain to produce additional 
costs.
77
  In congressional testimony comments on early Say on Pay bill, for example, a well-
known defender of existing executive pay practices stated: 
 
[Dodd Frank] would mandate a non-binding shareholder vote to approve the 
compensation of executives for every company every year. Companies with problems 
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will have a vote and, presumably, will receive a negative vote. But this is almost exactly 
what happens under the current system. So, it is not clear to me that the new bill would 
create any benefits. . . . The increased transparency for CEO pay required by the new 





2. Are shareholders competent to evaluate executive pay?   
 
Investors’ ability to determine when pay was appropriate was a second important issue.  
Advocates believed that shareholders would be able to discern and vote down poorly designed 
pay packages.
79
  Busy institutional investors would rely on ISS and the other proxy advisory 
firms for help when necessary. Critics were less sure that shareholders would be able to discern 
differences in pay plans.  Some pointed to the first six years of experience in the U.K., where, 
when pay policies were put to a vote, shareholders invariably approved executive pay packages 
and were doubtful about shareholders’ abilities.
80
 The thrust of their skepticism rested on the 
observation that given the vast number of companies most institutions invested in, it was 
unlikely that U.S. shareholders would give individualized attention to particular compensation 
schemes.
81
 This argument was bolstered by the relatively low levels of voting support for most 
Say on Pay shareholder proposals. The statistics showed that the number of shareholder 
proposals seeking an advisory vote on pay had been relatively constant and shareholder support 
had leveled off at about 42%.
82
  One critic summarized the empirical evidence as follows:  
 
Just last year, seven proposals for say-on-pay were introduced at companies in 2008, ten 
of them were successful.  
 
The average vote was a 60 percent vote against say-on-pay by the shareholders. At 
financial companies it is even higher. 70 percent was the average vote against say-on-pay 
at financial companies. So shareholders ... at the majority of companies in a very strong 
majority way have expressed dissatisfaction with say-on-pay proposals.
83
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 Ibid. at 339 (“The number of [Say on Pay] proposals grew only moderately [in 2008], to seventy, and the level of 
shareholder support has remained at the same level, approximately forty-two percent”).   
83
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While others criticized Say on Pay would be used to push political ideologies by activist 
shareholders,
84




3. Does Say on Pay increase the power of proxy voting advisory firms?   
 
Another potential criticism is that Say on Pay increases the power of proxy advisory 
firms, whose recommendations would be followed blindly by institutional shareholders,
86
 while 
management’s discretionary authority is undermined.
87
 To elaborate, if institutional shareholders 
rely heavily on proxy advisory firms, those companies will wield undue influence over voting on 
executive pay.
88
  Further, activist shareholders will focus selectively on a narrow range of 
compensation schemes, which proxy advisory firms identify as suspect. Finally, these voting 
advisors’ recommendations might be biased if the firm both provides voting advice to 
shareholders on pay packages and while simultaneously consulting with companies on their pay 
policies.
89
   
 
Supporters are quick to point out that proxy advisory firms serve the purpose of helping 
institutional (and other) shareholders use their voting power in a coordinated way to overcome 
collective action problems.
90
   As one prominent academic observed, "When institutional 
investors follow ISS [vote recommendations] en masse, directors of public corporations can 
expect to see 20%, 30% even 50% of their company's shares being voted not as the directors 
                                                          
84
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recommend, but as ISS recommends.”
91
   Voting advisory firms create and periodically revise 
"best practices" voting guidelines based on input from their clients, which fosters institutional 
shareholder activism and helps those clients with fiduciary obligations to vote in a way that 
protects plan assets.
92
 In the absence of proxy voting advisors, institutional shareholders bear the 
costs of performing their own research.
93
 This increased costs leads to the underproduction of 




  Proxy voting advisors may also serve as representatives for their clients’ interests, so that 
companies negotiate directly with the ISS to make changes to their compensation practices and 
thereby position themselves to get favorable voting recommendations.
95
 In this way, the proxy 
voting advisors serve as a monitor on behalf of shareholders of company activities, reviewing 
director performance, shareholder proposals, and voting contests, and formulating advice to 
shareholders on how to vote.
96
   
  
4. Can Say on Pay slow the growth of executive pay?   
 
Critics of the existing executive pay system claim that Say on Pay could dampen the 
spiral in executive pay. A strong negative shareholder Say on Pay vote might reduce excesses in 
executive pay according to some activist institutional shareholders.
97
 Thus, Say on Pay votes 
might make directors "more attentive" to shareholders and "deter some egregious compensation 
arrangements."
98
  Not all scholars agreed. Professors Cheffins and Thomas argue U.S. 
shareholders would use Say on Pay as a tool to vote down only those pay policies that “deviated 
far from the norm.”
99
This, they predicted, was insufficient to support some shareholders’ hopes 
that Say on Pay would stifle the upward spiral in executive pay.
100
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One critic claimed that caution should be exercised in adopting a shareholder vote 
because of the U.K. experience with Say on Pay.
101
 This academic pointed out that during the 
first six years of Say on Pay in U.K. public companies shareholders had consistently approved 





5. Will Say on Pay strengthen the pay-for-performance relationship?  
 
Most importantly, the academic debate focused on whether Say on Pay would create a 
stronger link between "pay and performance" and reduce companies’ "pay for failure."
103
 A 
prominent supporter concluded that an advisory vote on executive pay would allow shareholders 
to express their views on those flawed pay practices that were disconnected from company 
performance.
104
 In response, some critics of Say on Pay questioned whether pay and 
performance are actually divorced.
105
  One claimed:   
While there have clearly been abuses and unethical CEOs, pay for the typical CEO 
appears to be largely driven by market forces. ... Firms with CEOs in the top decile of 
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actual pay earned stock returns that were 90% greater than those of other firms in their 
industries over the previous 5 years. Firms with CEOs in the bottom decile of actual pay 
underperformed their industries by almost 40% in the previous 5 years. The results are 
qualitatively similar if we look at performance over the previous three years or previous 





Some empirical studies have focused on this question.  One detailed study of the U.K. 
Say on Pay experience looked at its effect on both disclosed changes in executive compensation 
and estimated undisclosed changes.
107
  The authors concluded:  
 
[S]ay on pay results in greater penalties for poor performance [in U.K. public 
companies]. In particular, most firms experiencing high voting dissent respond by 
removing controversial provisions that investors criticize as “rewards for failure” (e.g. 
large severance payments). The threat of voting dissent also seems to have an effect: 
many firms experiencing low dissent remove controversial provisions before the vote. 
Our regression tests document an increase in the pay-for-poor-performance sensitivity, 





6. Summary of academic arguments over Say on Pay 
 
Say on Pay provisions are contentious.  In the U.S. debate, supporters anticipated that Say 
on Pay would "empower shareholders to vote down pay structures that encourage excessive risk-
taking,"
109
 would make "corporate management more accountable to shareholders,"
110
 would 
help arrest the upward spiral in CEO pay,
111
 and would compel corporate boards to align pay 
with the corporation's financial performance.
112
  In short, supporters of Say on Pay predicted a 
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mandatory shareholder vote would alter the balance of power in US public corporations -- 
especially over executive pay -- moving it decidedly toward shareholders. As one government 
official said:  
 
You are empowering shareholders with the ability to have stronger oversight. You are 
forcing the company to think more seriously about what they do, how it will be perceived 
and not just to go on automatic pilot doing practices that are not defensible simply 




Opponents argue that Say on Pay would cause government to intrude in the boardroom
114
 
and put executive compensation in the "hands of government bureaucrats;"
115
 would upset the 
traditional distribution of power between boards and shareholders;
116
 would make it harder for 
companies, particularly in financial sector, to hire and retain the "best and brightest;"
117
 would be 
prohibitively expensive, particularly for smaller companies, to report their pay plans and give 
shareholders a vote;
118
 and would lead to activist shareholders favoring a narrow range of 
compensation programs, pushing U.S. public companies to adopt one-size-fits-all compensation 
plans.
119
  In short, these critics predicted Say on Pay would impose costs that outweigh its 
benefits.  
  
Section III next looks at the practical effects of Say on Pay in the U.K. and U.S. to 
provide additional insights into how Say on Pay might affect New Zealand if it was 
implemented. 
 
III. Lessons from the U.K. and U.S. experience 
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After the implementation of Say on Pay in a number of countries, it has become possible to 
observe its effects in practice.  In this section, we examine some of this evidence in an effort to 
shed some light on how the advisory vote has affected compensation practices, corporate 
governance and pay levels in two important countries: the United Kingdom and the United 
States. Other countries, Australia and the Netherlands in 2005, have also enacted Say on Pay 
legislation.
120
  The Dutch law calls for a binding shareholder vote, not merely an advisory one, 
but the vote does not necessarily happen annually and the shareholder vote concerns 
compensation policies, not a retrospective pay report.
121
 Following the Dutch model, Sweden in 
2006 and Norway in 2007 also enacted legislation requiring a binding shareholder vote on 
compensation policies.
122
 We do not specifically address these other countries’ experiences in 
this paper though. 
 
1. The Evidence from the U.K. 
 
The U.K. has had the longest experience with Say on Pay of any country. In 2002, the 
United Kingdom became the first country to mandate a shareholder vote on executive pay.
123
  
U.K.-incorporated listed companies were required to submit a Director’s Remuneration Report 
annually to shareholders and hold a non-binding shareholder vote on that report.
124
 Even after the 
enactment of non-binding Say on Pay, world events brought executive compensation to the front 
page of newspapers and enraged the public in the U.K. and the EU more broadly.
125
 Lehman 
Brothers historic collapse in the U.S. and the Royal Bank of Scotland’s crisis “reinvigorated the 
inquiry about what is appropriate remuneration in the EU.”
126
 Richard Lambert, the Director-
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General of the Confederation of British Industry stated, “top executives ‘risk being treated as 




 In June 2012, the U.K.’s Department for Business Innovation & Skills responded, 
releasing a consultation proposing compensation reporting regulations and implementation of 
binding Say on Pay in the U.K. for companies with shares on the Financial Services Authority’s 
Official List
128
 as well as all U.K. companies listed on the NYSE, the NASDAQ, or with shares 
listed in another EEA state, beginning in October 2013.
129
 The proposal was made at “a national 
level in consultation with companies, shareholders, institutional investors and other interested 
parties,”
130





 Initial reports indicate the government’s proposal will be included as part of the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill being debated in Parliament, which not only calls for a 
binding shareholder vote on compensation policies but also increases disclosure requirements.
132
 
This section is based on the evidence compiled under the advisory vote system, as the new rules 
have not yet been implemented and it is too early to determine if the binding vote will have 
different effects. 
 
In testimony before the American Congress, Professor Coates concluded that the U.K.’s 
experience with non-binding Say on Pay had been positive: 
 
different researchers have conducted several investigations [on the U.K. Say on Pay 
experience] . . . These findings suggest that say-on-pay legislation would have a positive 
impact on corporate governance in the U.S. While the two legal contexts are not 
identical, there is no evidence in the existing literature to suggest that the differences 
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His testimony drew from studies that compared U.K. pay practices before and after the 
U.K. Say on Pay mandate.  One such study concluded that the new rule had increased pay-for-
performance sensitivity at U.K. companies: 
 
Based on a large sample of U.K. firms over the period from 2000 to 2005, we find 
evidence of enhanced sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to negative operating 
performance and enhanced sensitivity of CEO total compensation to negative operating 
and stock performance after the new rule, consistent with widespread calls for less 




A second study, looking at the impact of the U.K. legislation on stock prices in high-pay 
companies and actual voting results under the U.K. Say on Pay regime, found a favorable 
shareholder reaction to the legislation and pay reforms at companies receiving negative votes on 
their pay practices: 
 
We examine the effect of say on pay regulation in the United Kingdom (U.K.). 
Consistent with the view that shareholders regard say on pay as a value-creating 
mechanism, the regulation’s announcement triggered a positive stock price reaction for 
firms with excess CEO pay. U.K. firms responded to negative say on pay voting 
outcomes by removing controversial CEO pay practices criticized as “rewards for 
failure” (e.g., generous severance contracts). The sensitivity of pay to poor realizations of 
performance increased in the post-say on pay period, particularly among firms that 





Recent evidence from the U.K. shows that shareholders there continue to press against high 




2. The American Experience 
 
A. Development of Say on Pay in the U.S. 
 
Say on Pay in the U.S. grew out of precatory shareholder-sponsored proposals submitted 
to the company for inclusion on its proxy statement under Rule 14a-8.
137
 These early Say on Pay 
shareholder proposals were uniformly opposed by management, but received significant 
shareholder support. Management opposed the proposals on the ground that the board of 
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directors was responsible for setting the terms of pay for the company's top executives.  In their 
eyes, shareholder input would reduce the effectiveness of the board's role.  
 
Initially, boards ignored Say on Pay proposals, even those supported by a majority of 
shareholders,
138
 but before too long, some companies began voluntarily to hold Say on Pay 
votes. The level of shareholder voting support for these proposals ranged from 10 to 50% 
depending on the company and type of request made in the proposal. 
 
In 2008, in response to public concerns about the financial crisis, Congress put Say on 
Pay on its legislative agenda. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) 
required that financial firms receiving TARP funds give their shareholders an advisory vote on 
executive pay.
139
 In 2009, the financial stimulus plan continued in place the Say on Pay 
requirement for financial firms that had outstanding TARP debts.
140
   
 
To implement this new legislation in 2009 the SEC adopted new rules.
141
  The SEC 
amended its proxy rules to require TARP recipients to permit a separate shareholder advisory 
vote on the firm's executive pay.  All told, one hundred financial firms held Say on Pay votes 
during the 2010 proxy season.
142
  The EESA mandate of Say on Pay for financial firms receiving 
TARP money expanded the shareholder Say on Pay movement, which had already targeted pay 
practices at certain financial-service firms.  
 
The EESA mandate expanded the pool of firms subject to Say on Pay votes beyond those 
targeted by shareholders as having “bad” compensation. Not surprisingly, shareholder voting 
support for these mandatory Say on Pay proposals increased.
143
 In fact, during the 2010 proxy 
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season, shareholders at TARP-funded firms on average voted 88.7% in support of management-
sponsored Say on Pay proposals. This is interesting given that most mandatory Say on Pay votes 
in 2010 were held at financial firms that had fared poorly during the financial crisis.   
 
 
B. Legislation and Implementation 
 
Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires public companies to give their shareholders 
an advisory vote to approve or disapprove the compensation paid to named executives during the 
prior fiscal year.
144
   The Act also requires an advisory vote by shareholders on golden parachute 
payments in any acquisition or merger.
145
 None of these votes, however, is to carry any 
mandatory force or change directors’ duties to shareholders.
146
  New Section 14A of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that management present "a separate resolution subject 
to shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives", though the vote "shall not be 




The SEC implemented Section 951 of Dodd-Frank with detailed requirements that 
specify the form of the Say on Pay proposal and the executive officers whose pay is subject to a 
shareholder vote.  The SEC required Say on Pay votes at public companies with more than a $75 




The Say on Pay vote applies only to the company’s CEO and the four other executive 
officers named in the company's proxy compensation table.
149
  The vote relates to the 
compensation disclosed in the proxy statement as described in the Compensation Discussion and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
The average vote was a 60 % vote against say-on-pay by the shareholders. At financial companies it is even 
higher. 70 % was the average vote against say-on-pay at financial companies. So shareholders have at 
least—shareholders at the majority of companies in a very strong majority way have expressed 
dissatisfaction with say-on-pay proposals.  
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  The vote is up or down as to the overall compensation package, and not as 
to the specific elements of compensation (such as bonuses, stock options, retirement pay, 
performance incentives).
151
   
The results of the Say on Pay vote must be disclosed on Form 8-K within four business 
days after the shareholders' meeting.
152
  In addition, the company must disclose -- in the next 
year's CD&A -- whether and how the board considered the results of the shareholder Say on Pay 
vote in making any decisions.
153
   
 
C. Impact of Say on Pay 
 
In the 2011 proxy season, the inaugural year for Say on Pay, shareholders voted on these 
management proposals at about 2,200 US public companies.
154
  Briefly, the results showed 
several clear trends.  First, shareholders strongly supported existing pay practices at most firms 
with Say on Pay votes garnering on average 91.2% support.  Second, these proposals were voted 
down only 1.6% of the time
155
 mostly based apparently on by pay-for-performance concerns. 
Third, shareholder votes were highly correlated to company share returns and CEO pay, with low 
returns and high CEO pay resulting in lower Say on Pay support. Fourth, negative Say on Pay 
recommendations by third party voting advisors, ISS and others, prompted many companies to 
modify their disclosure filings or to change their pay practices (sometimes retroactively) to win 
support. 
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The 2011 proxy season was claimed by some to be a watershed event in U.S. corporate 
governance.  The Say on Pay votes mandated by Dodd-Frank, in these commentators’ eyes, 
catalyzed greater management attention to shareholder concerns, increased shareholder interest 
in voting on corporate governance, and a broader dialogue on pay issues between management 
and shareholders (and proxy advisory firms).
156
   
 
One thing that did not happen during the 2011 proxy season, however, was a shareholder 
backlash at increasing levels of executive pay.  Despite some third party voting advisors’ 
recommendations that Say on Pay proposals be evaluated, in part, on the basis of whether 
inappropriate "peer group benchmarking" had led to ratcheting up of executive pay, the upward 
spiral in CEO pay seemed not to be on the minds of shareholders.  
  
Even before the Say on Pay vote, management at many companies made changes to the 
substance and disclosure of their pay programs.  According to a study by the Conference Board 
on pay practices, many companies changed the terms of their pay programs to more clearly align 
pay to performance.  In addition, many companies revised the content of the Compensation 
Discussion & Analysis (CD&A) filed with the annual meeting proxy materials.  At many 
companies whose pay programs received negative Say on Pay recommendations by proxy 
advisory firms, management at some such companies engaged with shareholders following an 
“against” recommendation.   
 
Management at many companies also seems to be responding more to Say on Pay rebukes.  
For example, two companies that voluntarily put Say on Pay on the ballot in 2010 (Occidental 
Petroleum and KeyCorp) and received majority opposition, changed their pay practices.
157
  As a 
result, shareholders gave significantly more support to the revised pay packages at these firms in 
2011.  Some companies with failed Say on Pay votes in 2011, however, have chosen not to 
change their pay practices, but instead to blame the proxy advisory firms.  
 
D. Empirical Research and Implications 
 
One empirical study of the 2011 Say on Pay voting results used multiple regression 
analysis to examine what factors influence the percentage shareholder vote in favor of Say on 
Pay.  It looked at the following independent variables:  (1) negative ISS recommendation, (2) 
excess CEO pay, (3) percentage change in CEO pay, and (4) an interaction term for companies 
that are both in the highest quintile for excess pay and the lowest quintile for total stock return 
(that is, the worst performing companies with the most excessively-paid CEOs). The study found 
that all of these independent variables are negative factors in Say on Pay votes and statistically 
significant, except for percentage change in CEO pay -- which was insignificant.  However, an 
ISS “against” recommendation is much more relevant to shareholder voting than – and even 
dwarfs in predictive value -- the “excess” pay and combined low TSR/high excess pay.
158
 This 
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analysis suggests that the ISS may be identifying the principal factors that shareholders find 
relevant in their Say on Pay votes -- or that shareholders believe the ISS has done this for them.  
  
The analysis also suggests that shareholders on their own – though to a lesser extent than 
the ISS – identify some “outlier” companies based on their independent analysis of “excess” pay 
and its interaction with TSR.   In all, the ISS identification of “outlier” companies through an 
“against” voting recommendation and the further identification of such companies by 
shareholders (beyond that contained in a negative ISS recommendation) based on company 
“excess” pay/TSR seem to explain how Say on Pay was used in its inaugural year to identify and 
discipline pay practices at “outlier” firms. Nonetheless, these factors were less than fully 
explanatory of Say on Pay voting in the first year under Dodd-Frank and other factors may have 
been influential.   
 
Several other papers have recently examined different aspects of Say on Pay in the U.S. 
One important study found that the stocks of firms with excessively high executive remuneration 
reacted positively to the passage of the federal legislation enacting Say on Pay, indicating that 
shareholders of these firms viewed this event as positive news.
159
 Another paper casts doubt on 
the value of companies revising their pay packages in response to negative Say on Pay votes, 




The first year of Say on Pay under Dodd-Frank confirmed that executive pay is on the 
minds of shareholders in U.S. companies.  Led by the ISS, shareholders showed their concern – 
though not reflexively -- about pay packages that rewarded CEOs despite weak company stock 
performance or with excess pay compared to that at similar companies.  More than any factor, 
though, being targeted by the ISS for “outlier” pay practices was relevant to shareholder Say on 
Pay voting.  However, excess compensation levels and poor corporate performance are also 
important triggers for negative stockholder votes. Say on Pay votes increase the pressure on 




Changes in corporate governance behavior – such as more complete disclosure of pay-
for-performance policies and the reversal of specific, controversial pay practices -- inaugurated 
by Say on Pay in 2011 appear to be continuing apace and maybe even gathering strength in 
2012.
162
  It appears that in the U.S. shareholder scrutiny of corporate pay practices using Say on 
Pay votes will not be a passing phenomenon.  
 
IV. Should New Zealand Adopt Say on Pay? 
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A. Lessons to Draw From Elsewhere 
 
What lessons should New Zealand draw from other countries’ experiences with Say on Pay? 
Academics predicted that Say on Pay would alter the shareholder role in corporate governance, 
differing on whether this was a good or a bad thing. In fact, Say on Pay has made relatively little 
difference to the existing allocation of power in the U.K. and U.S. to present. Other academics 
questioned whether shareholders are competent to evaluate executive pay, an argument bolstered 
by the high level of voting support on Say on Pay proposals to date. However, there is evidence 
that shareholders vote against proposals at firms with abnormally high levels of executive pay 
that are experiencing poor corporate performance. Reports from the U.K., where Say on Pay has 
been in place since 2002, indicate that it has had a positive effect on corporate governance and 




There are also two features of the New Zealand corporate governance system that may make 
Say on Pay less effective from shareholders’ perspective.  First, there are relatively few public 
companies that have dispersed ownership structures.  In other words, at most New Zealand 
public companies shareholders already have substantial power to influence executive pay by 
virtue of their relative high concentration or blockholdings.  Second, presently there are no third 
party voting advisors based in New Zealand.  Given the lack of barriers to entry for these firms, 
their absence likely reflects a lack of demand for their services currently.  Taking into account 
the relatively small number of dispersed ownership firms in New Zealand, it seems unlikely that 
implementing Say on Pay will change that situation. 
 
This mitigates the concern, expressed in the U.S. and U.K., that Say on Pay increased the 
power of proxy voting advisory firms. Proxy advisory firms can serve a useful function, 
including acting as monitors for shareholders.  The evidence of their value to shareholders in Say 
on Pay votes is somewhat mixed though.   
 
Critics predicted that Say on Pay would not halt spiraling executive pay and that has largely 
proved to be correct. In the U.S., where Say on Pay has been in place only since 2011, Say on 
Pay proposals were only voted down 1.6 % of the time,
164
 mostly based on pay-for-performance 
concerns.
165
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Predictions by some that Say on Pay would strengthen the pay-for-performance relationship 
have had mixed reviews.  While at most companies, shareholders have been willing to accept 
board’s views on the subject, there is evidence of fewer “rewards for failure” at UK firms after 
implementation of Say on Pay there.
167
 Most interestingly, negative say on pay recommendations 
by proxy firms resulted in many companies changing their pay practices to win support with one 
study showing these negative recommendations have more effect on voting than any other 
factor.
168






B. Can Say on Pay Be Adopted With Existing New Zealand Corporate Law? 
  
Do New Zealand’s existing corporate code and practices create any barriers to the adoption 
of an advisory Say on Pay vote?  One anachronistic practice in New Zealand listed companies 
that potentially limits the ability of institutional shareholders to restrict excessive executive 
director remuneration is the continuation of the practice of voting by show of hands. The New 
Zealand Stock Exchange requires listed companies to include a section on voting at shareholder 
meetings in their constitution but many companies adopt rules around meetings that are similar 
to those found in the First Schedule of the Companies Act 1993. The chairperson is empowered to 
determine the method of voting unless a poll is demanded.  The chairperson can choose either 
voting by voice or by show of hands.   A declaration by the chairperson that the resolution is carried 
is conclusive unless a poll is then demanded.
169
 This practice would have to be discontinued if New 
Zealand decided to implement Say on Pay legislation. Say on pay is predicated on one vote per 
share and, as overseas experience shows, proxy voting and ideally the development of proxy 
advisory firms should become prevalent for say on pay legislation to be effective. The tradeoff 
would be the introduction of a more bureaucratic and time consuming voting system in meetings 
with resulting and associated delays and costs. However, even if say on pay were not adopted, 
fostering the development of proxy advisory firms and encouraging proxy voting may benefit the 
New Zealand share market.   
  
If desired, there are at least two existing corporate law rules and practices that could be 
modified to adopt advisory Say on Pay in New Zealand.  First, the New Zealand Companies Act 
1993 has a little utilized provision that potentially would allow shareholders to have Say on Pay. 
Section 109 mandates that the chairperson of a meeting of shareholders of a company must allow 
a reasonable opportunity for shareholders at the meeting to question, discuss, or comment on the 
management of the company. A meeting of shareholders may pass a resolution under this section 
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relating to the management of a company. Unless the constitution provides that the resolution is 
binding, such a resolution is not binding on the board.   
 
A second alternative method would be for shareholders to ask for a poll. Under current law, 
five shareholders, or a shareholder or shareholders holding 10 % of the voting power or the paid up 
capital in the company, can demand a poll.
170
 Also, if a chairperson holds sufficient postal votes to 
make him or her believe it may change the outcome of the vote, the chairperson must call for a 
poll.
171
  A poll may be demanded either before or after the vote is taken on a resolution but it is 
relatively unusual for this right to be exercised at the annual meeting. Some commentators have 
called on shareholders to exercise this right.
172
   
 
A third option would be to simply adopt the U.K. rule, or the American rule, suitably 
modified to conform to the requirements of New Zealand corporate law. Section 211 of the 
Companies Act 1993 could be amended to extend the requirement that each director’s 
remuneration be disclosed to a requirement that a directors’ report be prepared that contains 
details of board policy on remuneration and the relationship between pay and performance. To 
be consistent with other jurisdictions, the requirement could be limited to listed companies. Such 
a requirement exists in Australia, although Australia, with its two strikes regime, goes further.
173
 
Section 161 could be amended to require a non-binding ordinary resolution approving the 
directors’ remuneration report. Alternatively s 109 could be amended extending shareholders’ 
right to vote on the management of the company to a right to vote on the directors’ remuneration 
report.  
 
C. Should New Zealand Adopt Say on Pay? 
 
At the end of the day, in our view, the arguments for introducing Say on Pay are not 
compelling either for it or against it. There is no evidence that it would drive down the level of 
executive remuneration levels in New Zealand.  Rather, as in other jurisdictions, current CEO 
pay levels and increases seem to be more a result of existing disclosure regimes and labor market 
forces than a lack of shareholder power. Evidence from the U.K. and U.S. does indicate that say 
on pay votes there have had an effect on pay-for-poor-performance.  However, it is unclear that 
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those countries’ experience will extend to New Zealand as shareholders in those nations rely 
heavily on the recommendations of ISS to overcome significant collective action problems.  At 
present, in New Zealand, no comparable third party voting advisor firms exist.  
 
The strongest arguments in favor of Say On Pay’s introduction are the likelihood it will have 
some effect of remuneration of executives in poorly performing firms, and that it may lead to a 
possible improvement in the standard of corporate governance driven by the increased 
shareholder scrutiny of pay packages that would be part of such a reform. It is likely to lead to 
greater dialogue between shareholders and directors about executive remuneration, but the 
empirical evidence from the U.S. is that too much responsiveness by corporate directors on pay 
changes is viewed negatively by the stock market.
174
  Finally, the desirability of harmonizing 
New Zealand’s laws with those in comparable jurisdictions, in particular the U.K. and Australia, 
where Say on Pay has been in place for many years, is a valid, but not decisive, argument in 
support of its introduction. It is worth noting that both of those countries have abandoned the 
non-binding shareholder vote on executive remuneration in favor of a binding vote, and that the 
impact of that change is yet to be determined. 
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